Testing assumptions of The “slippery Slope Framework” using cross-country data: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa by Mas’ud, Abdulsalam et al.
TESTING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE “SLIPPERY SLOPE 
FRAMEWORK” USING CROSS-COUNTRY DATA: 
EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Abdulsalam Mas’ud♣ 
Hussaini Adamu Federal Polytechnic





The emergence of “Slippery Slope Framework” has attracted many researchers who examined 
the effect of trust in authorities and power of authorities on tax compliance using both the real 
taxpayer and student subjects. However, these researchers have neglected the use of cross-
country data to examine these effects. In line with prior empirical evidences that confirm the 
effect of trust and power of authorities on tax compliance, this study hypothesizes that both 
trust and power have association with tax compliance across countries. It further hypothesizes 
that trust has more association with tax compliance than power. This study is based on 49 Sub-
Saharan African countries as the population, out of which 37 countries were selected using 
multi-stage random sampling. The empirical results from these countries reveal that there is 
an association between both trust in authorities and power of authorities and tax compliance 
across the 37 Sub-Saharan African countries, but the association between power of authorities 
and tax compliance is stronger than that of trust in authorities and tax compliance. Further, 
the result does not find any causing effect of both trust and power on tax compliance in the 
countries that constituted the study sample.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Though “deterrence models” proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan 
(1973) have failed to fully explain why individuals pay taxes, they still remain significant 
in tax compliance research. The concept of “psychological tax contract” proposed by Feld 
and Frey (2007) and Torgler, Demir, Macintyre and Schaffner (2008) have also contributed 
to understanding why individuals pay taxes without enforcement. The combination of these 
efforts provides a robust framework known as the “Slippery Slope Framework” by Kirchler, 
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Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) which to a certain extent, explains why people pay taxes with or without 
enforcement, i.e., either through trust in authorities leading to voluntary tax compliance or 
through power of authorities leading to enforced tax compliance. Since the emergence of the 
Slippery Slope Framework, studies have been conducted to test the effect of trust and power to 
explain compliance behavior using real taxpayers and students simulations. However, analyses 
have not yet been using cross-country data. Therefore, this study aims to examine the effect of 
trust and power using African cross-country data generated from difference sources.
 
The second part of the paper provides a conceptual framework and review of previous empirical 
analyses relating to the effect of trust and power on tax compliance. The third part deals with 
the methodology used to conduct the study. The fourth part presents the results and analysis. 
Finally, a conclusion is drawn. 
2.  CONCEPT OF TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR
Tax compliance has been divided into two perspectives: administrative compliance, i.e., 
adherence to applicable tax laws; and judicious compliance in terms of accurate completion of 
tax returns (Chow, 2004). Regardless of its type, tax compliance has been defined as reporting 
to the relevant tax authority all income and tax payments using the applicable tax laws and 
regulations as well as court orders (Jackson & Milliron, 1986). It can also be defined as an 
individual’s act of filing tax returns, declaring all income accurately for tax purposes and 
paying tax liabilities on the due dates as stipulated by the authority or applicable tax laws (Palil 
& Mustapha, 2011). Similarly, voluntary tax compliance has been defined as “timely filing and 
reporting of required tax information, the correct self-assessment of taxes owed and the timely 
payment of those taxes without enforcement action” (Silvani & Baer, 1997, p. 11). Under 
voluntary tax compliance, taxpayers have to assess themselves using correct information in 
a timely manner, report the tax due, file the tax returns with the relevant tax authority and 
make timely payment of the tax payable, usually to designated banks. However, enforced 
compliance refers to a situation where taxpayers will only be willing to comply with their tax 
obligations either due to fear of being detected or audited. 
The issue of tax and tax compliance behavior is as old as mankind (Ramona-Anca & Larissa-
Margareta, 2012).  People naturally do not want to pay taxes; however, in this world, two things 
are inevitable, i.e., death and taxes (Alm, 1999). This inherent hatred to pay taxes has therefore 
resulted in authorities being very concerned about tax compliance behavior. This has led to 
researchers widely studying the effect of tax evasion and noncompliance. Noncompliance 
comprises two categories: intentional and unintentional. Intentional noncompliance is caused 
by tax evasion; while unintentional non-compliance is caused by the taxpayers’ lack of 
knowledge or ignorance of tax laws or financial condition (Loo, 2006).
The issue of tax noncompliance is a global phenomenon that governments in both developed 
and developing nations have to deal with. For instance, the amount of unpaid income taxes 
for individuals and corporations was about USD 127 billion for the 1992 tax year in the 
United States (US) (Alm, 1999).  Recently, tax evasion in the US averages USD 285 billion 
annually (Cobham, 2005). More recently, in 2011, the unpaid taxes amounted to USD 373 
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billion (Government Accountability Office, 2012). In developing countries, statistics estimate 
the average tax evasion in 2002 as being between 35 and 55% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), which is worse than that of developed nations, like the US (Terkper, 2003). In 2011, 
tax revenues accounted for more than 33% of the GDP in developed countries compared to 
less than 20% in African countries (Carter & Cebreiro, 2011).
In addition, about 95% of personal income taxes  in developing countries come from the 
formal sector through withholding tax, particularly Pay As You Earn (PAYE), of which 
tax was deducted by the public sector and large firms from the salaries and wages of their 
employees, compared to 80% in developed nations (International Monetary Fund, 2011, p. 31). 
International Monetary Fund further states that less than 5% of the population in developing 
countries pays personal income tax compared to about 50% in developed nations. Further, 
only about 15% of taxpayers’ incomes are reached for tax purposes compared to about 57% 
in developed countries. A comparison of  personal income tax as a percentage of GDP reveals 
that for the period of 1980– 2005, personal income tax was 9-11% of GDP in developed 
countries compared to less than 2% in developing countries (Sabirianova, Buttrick, & Duncan, 
2009, pp. 24-25). Therefore, tax compliance behavior will continue to be an area of research 
in both developed and developing countries in years to come.
2.1. The Slippery Slope Framework Concept
The Slippery Slope Framework for tax compliance behavior was developed by Kirchler, et al. 
(2008) through conceptual analysis. The Framework shows the need to consider the power and 
trust in authorities and their forceful interaction for a better understanding of tax compliance 
behavior. The Framework highlights how power and trust play important roles in both enforced 
and voluntary tax compliance, respectively. Figure 1 below is the schematic representation of 
the Framework.
Figure 1: The Slippery Slope Framework
Source: Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008: p 212)
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Power of authorities means taxpayers’ perception of the ability of tax officers to detect illegal 
tax noncompliance. This can be through rigorous audit to detect the evasion and authorities’ 
power to fine the evaders. Trust in authorities means the general opinion of taxpayers and 
social groups that the tax authorities are compassionate, work beneficially for the common 
good of the citizens, ensure good governance and are not corrupt. Kirchler, et al. (2008) assert 
that both trust and power interact to explain tax compliance. Hence, if taxpayers perceive that 
tax authorities are powerful and trustworthy, the result would be high compliance, and vice 
versa.
2.2. Prior Empirical Analysis of the Slippery Slope Framework
To further prove the assumption of the Slippery Slope Framework, Wahl, Kastlunger and 
Kirchler (2010) provided the first empirical analysis of the main hypotheses of the “Slippery 
Slope Framework”. The Framework’s assumption is that both trust in authorities and power 
of authorities increase tax compliance. The study was conducted through two experiments. 
Experiment 1 (students) examined the effect of voluntary compliance and enforced compliance 
on the overall tax compliance with mediating effect of trust and power, respectively. The two 
independent variables of voluntary and enforced compliance were jointly moderated by age, 
gender and income (demographic variable). Experiment 2 (self-employed) examined the 
effect of intended tax payment, voluntary tax payment, enforced tax payment and strategic tax 
payment on overall tax payment through the moderating effect of age, gender and income. A 
quantitative research paradigm was employed with 124 students in Experiment 1and 186 self-
employed in Experiment 2.  Computer aided programmed with z-tree was used in Experiment 
1; whereas Experiment 2 used questionnaires sent to the email addresses of the subjects. 
Data of Experiment 1 was analyzed using descriptive statistics with 2-way MANCOVA and 
ANCOVA; while Experiment 2 used descriptive statistics with 2-way ANCOVA. The results 
showed that voluntary compliance is high when the authorities are trustworthy. 
Researchers have continued to test the Slippery Slope Framework assumptions globally. 
Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler and Schabmann (2013) investigated the assumptions of the 
Slippery Slope Framework through model testing and enhanced the existing evidence on the 
framework by distinguishing coercive power from legitimate power.  The study correlated tax 
evasion with enforced tax compliance, voluntary tax compliance, legitimate power, coercive 
power and trust. Quantitative research paradigm was employed with 389 Italian subjects as 
sample. Data was collected through online and mail surveys. Structural Equation Modeling was 
used to analyze the data. The result showed that trust enhanced voluntary tax compliance and 
voluntary tax compliance itself is negatively related to tax evasion. Accordingly, it confirms 
the assumption of the Slippery Slope Framework that coercive power affects enforced tax 
compliance. Further, the result showed that both voluntary and enforced compliance, as well 
as trust and coercive power, are negatively related. 
Kogler et al. (2012) tested the main assumptions of the Slippery Slope Framework in four 
European countries.  The research measured how the four variables of intended tax compliance, 
voluntary tax compliance, enforced tax compliance and strategic tax compliance mediate 
the relationship between tax compliance and the independent variables of trust, power and 
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country. Experimental quantitative research design was employed on 1,319 students from 
four universities in the four countries under the study. Data was collected through the survey 
method using questionnaires and analyzed using three way MANOVA descriptive statistics. 
Results showed strong effect of trust and power separately on compliance. A joint effect of 
trust and power on tax compliance was also found. There was also a weak effect of trust, 
power and country on tax compliance. A strong effect was found on trust and country as well 
as power and country. 
In another research, Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) presented a model with heterogeneous agents 
who maximize their individual utility based on income (after-tax) and the conjectured level 
of per capita public expenditure. This was an extension of the Slippery Slope Framework. 
They studied the relationship between tax compliance as a dependent variable with citizenship 
(perception of public expenditure, peer influence, risk aversion, morality) and power as 
independent variables. Experimental research design was employed based on 250 simulations. 
Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics. The results showed that both citizenship and 
power are required for tax compliance. But citizenship has more influence on compliance than 
power. The study extended one part of the slippery slope framework (trust) by adding more 
dimension to it, thereby changing the variable name citizenship. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that several scholars have tested the assumptions of the 
Slippery Slope Framework in various countries using different subjects and simulations. 
The findings of these studies indicate that trust and power interact to explain the compliance 
behavior of taxpayers. However, none of the studies has examined the effect of trust and power 
on tax compliance using cross-country data. Therefore, this study intends to examine this 
assumption so as to provide more evidence using a different research dimension, based on the 
following hypotheses from a cross-country perspective:
H1 Trust in Authorities has a significantly positive correlation with tax compliance
H2 Power of Authorities has a significantly positive correlation with tax compliance
H3 Trust has a more significantly positive correlation with tax compliance than power
H4 Trust and Power explain tax compliance (causing effect)
3.  METHODOLOGY
This section discusses the methodology and methods used in conducting the study, as well as 
the population, sample, variables, measurement, data and the research model.
3.1. Population and Sample
The population of the study is 49 Sub-Saharan African countries as contained in the World 
Bank Group-WBG (2012). A sample of 37 countries was selected using multi-stage sampling 
technique. In the first stage, countries were selected based on the availability of data on the 
three variables of the study; nine countries were dropped due to lack of complete data for all 
the three variables, leaving 40 countries. In the second stage, three countries were found to be 
outliers when power and trust were tested individually against tax compliance, leaving a final 
sample of 37 countries. 
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3.2. Variables and Variable Measurement
For tax compliance (TC), tax as a percentage of GDP for all the countries was used. We 
generated scores of 1-10 for this data by dividing tax as a percentage of GDP by 100 and 
multiplying by 10. This approach was similar to that reported by the IMD index and disclosed 
in Kim (2008, p. 407). For instance, tax as a percentage of GDP for Norway and Denmark is 
57% and 55.9%, respectively; and their tax evasion scores as reported by IMD are 5.67 and 
5.43, respectively. This depicts some level of consistencies between tax as a percentage of 
GDP and tax evasion scores of IMD. The interpretation of the IMD is that the higher the score, 
the lower the evasion (higher compliance). Similarly, in our tax compliance score, the higher 
the score, the higher the compliance (lower evasion).
For trust (TRUST), we used Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) as a proxy of trust. Similar studies on cross-country analysis (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; 
Torgler, Schaffner, & Macintyre, 2007; Torgler & Schneider, 2009) have used the same as 
proxy of trust. TI measured CPI on class intervals (high corruption 0-9; 10-19; 20-29; 30-39; 
40-49; 50-59; 60-69; 70-79; 80–89; 90 -100 low corruption).
For power (POWER), we used the rule of law as a proxy based on the definition of the WBG 
in Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The study used the same proxy to compare 
Austria with other European countries in terms of power of authorities. The rule of law, as 
defined in the WGI is based on Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2010) methodology. 
It is based on percentile of  power (low power 0-10th; 11-20th; 21-30th; 31- 40th; 41-50th; 
51-60th; 61-70th; 71-80th; 81-90th; 91-100th high power).
3.3. Data and Data Analysis
The data was obtained from different sources. Data relating to tax as a percentage of GDP was 
sourced from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) database for the year 2012 (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2012). The rule of law was sourced from the WBG report for the year 
2012 (World Bank Group, 2012). Lastly, CPI was sourced from the TI report for the year 2012 
(Transparency International, 2012). Data was analyzed using SPSS version 19. The data is 
presented in Table 1 below:
3.4. Research Model
From these three variables we developed a model: 
TCi = β0 + β1 TRUSTi + β2 POWERi + µi
where TCi is tax compliance rating for a country; β0 constant; TRUST is the trust in authorities; 
POWER is power of authorities; and µ the error term. 
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Table 1: Tax as Percentage of GDP and Tax Evasion Scores of African Countries













 1 Sao Tome and Prin. 39.9 3.99 28.2 42
 2 Swaziland 38.7 3.87 42.3 37
 3 Equatorial Guinea 37.4 3.74 11.3 20
 4 Namibia 36.8 3.68 61.0 48
 5 Botswana 31.3 3.13 69.5 65
 6 Mozambique 29.6 2.96 33.8 32
 7 Congo, Dem. Rep., 28.3 2.83 1.9 21
 8 Liberia 27.8 2.78 17.8 41
 9 Mauritania 27.2 2.72 21.1 31
 10 Gabon 27.1 2.71 38.0 35
 11 Eritrea 26.1 2.61 7.5 26
 12 South Africa 25.9 2.59 58.7 43
 13 Niger 25.8 2.58 37.1 33
 14 Chad 25.4 2.54 3.8 19
 15 Senegal 24.2 2.42 40.4 36
 16 Ghana 23.8 2.38 54.5 45
 17 Guinea 23.6 2.36 3.3 24
 18 Rwanda 23.1 2.31 46.9 53
 19 Cape Verde 22.9 2.29 63.8 60
 20 Burkina Faso 21.9 2.19 44.6 38
 21 Togo 20.7 2.07 23.5 30
 22 Zambia 20.7 2.07 39.4 37
 23 Cote d'Ivoire 20.3 2.03 8.0 29
 24 Tanzania 19.7 1.97 34.3 35
 25 Gambia, The 19.7 1.97 54.5 34
 26 Cameroon 19.0 1.90 16.0 26
 27 Benin 18.9 1.89 27.2 36
 28 Kenya 18.0 1.80 16.4 27
 29 Mali 17.6 1.76 35.7 34
 30 Madagascar 17.4 1.74 23.9 32
 31 Central African Rep. 15.7 1.57 7.0 26
 32 Ethiopia 15.2 1.52 29.1 33
 33 Uganda 14.8 1.48 43.7 29
 34 Guinea-Bissau 14.8 1.48 6.1 25
 35 Sierra Leone 13.5 1.35 22.5 31
 36 Nigeria 8.3 0.83 9.9 27
 37 Sudan 6.6 0.66 2.8 13
S/N
Note: n=37
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4.  RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 2 depicts the descriptive statistics of the three variables of the study.  Table 3 presents 
Pearson correlations among the variables. Table 4 presents the regression analysis on the effect 
of trust and power on tax compliance. The results are depicted below.
The TC scores range from 0.66 to 3.99. TC mean score of 2.2911 is considered above average, 
since it is more than 50% of 3.99, meaning that TC among African countries is higher than 
average. The TRUST scores range from 1.9 to 69.50. Thus, TRUST mean score of 29.3378 
is considered low, since it is less than 50% of 69.50. This implies that TRUST in authorities 
among African countries is less than average. The POWER scores range from 13 to 65. The 
mean score for POWER of 33.8649 is considered above average, since it is more than 50% 
of 65.00. This implies that POWER of authorities is above average for Sub-Saharan Africa.        
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Note: N=37 list-wise
MaximumMean MinimumN Standard 
Deviation
Variables
 TC 37 2.2911 .77187 .66 3.99
 TRUST 37 29.3378 19.30408 1.90 69.50
 POWER 37 33.8649 10.73458 13.00 65.00
Table 3: Pearson Correlation
Note: *significant at 0.001; ** significant at 0.05
TRUSTTC POWERVariables
 TC 1.000 0.298; 0.037** 0.361;  0.014**
 TRUST - 1.000 0.849;  0.000*
 POWER - - 1.000
Table 4: Regression Analysis
Note: Dependent Variable: TC; *Significant at α = 0.01; ** Significant at α = 0.10
StatisticsIndependent Variable
 Constant 0.008 (2.829)*
 Power 0.920 (-0.101)
 Trust 0.210 (1.277)
 R2 13%
 R2 Adjusted 7.9%
 F 2.547**
 F test significance 0.093**
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Pearson correlation analysis in Table 3 was used to test Hypotheses 1 to 3 above, whereas 
regression analysis in Table 4 served as a basis for testing Hypothesis 4. 
In Table 3, the result of the Pearson correlation shows that the correlation between TRUST 
and TC is positive and significant (Pearson= 0.298, p = 0.037). This supports Hypothesis 1 
which postulates that there is a significantly positive correlation between trust in authorities 
and tax compliance. This is consistent with previous studies (Kastlunger, et al., 2013; Kirchler, 
Hofmann, & Gangl, 2012; Kogler, et al., 2012; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 
2011;  van Dijke & Verboon, 2010; Wahl, et al., 2010) which confirm the association of trust 
in authorities and tax compliance. 
Likewise, Pearson correlation in Table 3 shows that there is a significantly positive correlation 
between POWER and TC (Pearson= 0.361, p = 0.014). This also confirms the Hypothesis that 
power of authorities has a significantly positive correlation with tax compliance, consistent 
with prior research on the association of power of authorities and tax compliance (Kastlunger, 
et al., 2013; Kirchler, et al., 2012; Kogler, et al., 2012; Muehlbacher, et al., 2011; van Dijke & 
Verboon, 2010; Wahl, et al., 2010).  
Additionally, it can be deduced from the Pearson correlation analysis in Table 3 that the 
significantly positive correlation between POWER and TC is higher than that of TRUST 
and TC. This is contrary to our postulation that TRUST has a more significantly positive 
correlation with TC than POWER. The result shows that the correlation between POWER 
and TC is higher (Pearson = 0.361, p = 0.014) than that of TRUST and POWER (Pearson 
= 0.298, p = 0.037). This does not support Hypothesis that trust in authorities has a more 
significantly positive correlation with tax compliance than power of authorities.  The essence 
of this hypothesis is to test which of the two elements of the Slippery Slope Framework is 
more correlated to tax compliance so as to highlight policy insights to African policymakers. 
By implication, power of authorities better explains compliance than trust in authorities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This finding is consistent with the assertion of Fjeldstad (2001) who 
posited that tax revenue performance in some African countries depends on the degree of 
coercive power associated with tax enforcement.
In Table 4, the regression analysis shows neither POWER (t= -101, p=0.92) nor TRUST (t= 
1.277, p=0.21) has significant causing effect on TC in Sub-Saharan Africa using cross-country 
data. The regression analysis above analyses depicts significant level of reliability based on 
similar studies (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006). 
5.  CONCLUSION
The study examines the effect of trust in authorities and power of authorities on tax compliance 
using cross-country data for Sub-Saharan Africa. The result from statistical analysis implies 
the need for African countries to be committed to increasing the level of trust citizens have on 
the government; more specifically, tax authorities and officials. Central and state governments 
should ensure the provision of high quality of services and building qualitative infrastructures 
with taxpayers’ money which in essence will increase the level of trust citizens have for 
the authorities. It is hoped that the result from this study can help increase tax compliance. 
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Corrupt practices among tax officials should also be curtailed in order to enhance taxpayers’ 
compliance. Another implication of the study is the need for increased use of power by the 
government. Specifically, the use of power by tax authorities may be able to enhance tax 
compliance. Increasing power of detection and penalty could be among the measures Sub-
Saharan Africa countries can employ to enhance tax compliance. Compared to the two 
measures of trust and power, increased power seems to be a greater requirement as highlighted 
by the statistical results. 
We recommend future studies to use panel data in Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e., for a number of 
years across countries so as to ensure the findings can hold overtime. We also recommend using 
this approach for other countries so as to further test the assumptions of the “Slippery Slope 
Framework” using cross-country analysis. Using panel data in other continents in testing the 
Framework’s assumptions is also recommended.
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Testing Assumptions of the “Slippery Slope Framework” Using Cross-Country Data: 





 TC 37 .66 3.99 2.2911 .77187
 TRUST 37 1.90 69.50 29.3378 19.30408
 POWER 37 13.00 65.00 33.8649 10.73458
 Valid N (listwise) 37    
Correlations
Note: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
TRUSTTC
 TC Pearson Correlation 1 .298*
  Sig. (1-tailed)  .037
  N 37 37
 TRUST Pearson Correlation .298* 1
  Sig. (1-tailed) .037 
  N 37 37
Correlations
Note: *. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
POWERTC
 TC Pearson Correlation 1 .361*
  Sig. (1-tailed)  .014
  N 37 37
 POWER Pearson Correlation .361* 1
  Sig. (1-tailed) .014 
  N 37 37
Variables Entered/Removedb
Note:  a. All requested variables entered.
 b. Dependent Variable: TC
MethodVariables RemovedModel Variables Entered
 1 POWER, TRUST . Enter
Model Summaryb




 1 .361a .130 .079 .74069
Note:  a. Predictors: (Constant), POWER, TRUST
  b. Dependent Variable: TC
Abdulsalam Mas’ud, Nor Aziah Abd Manaf and Natrah Saad
421 Testing Assumptions of the “Slippery Slope Framework” Using Cross-Country Data: 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
ANOVAb
FDf Mean SquareSum of SquaresModel
1   Regression 2.795 2 1.397 2.547 .093a
 Residual 18.653 34 .549  
 Total 21.448 36   
Note:  a. Predictors: (Constant), POWER, TRUST




 Predicted Value 1.7435 3.1075 2.2911 .27863 37
 Std. Predicted Value -1.965 2.930 .000 1.000 37
 Standard Error of Predicted Value .123 .389 .200 .068 37
 Adjusted Predicted Value 1.7787 3.1464 2.2947 .29019 37
 Residual -1.29407 1.81228 .00000 .71983 37
 Std. Residual -1.747 2.447 .000 .972 37
 Stud. Residual -1.802 2.545 -.002 1.013 37
 Deleted Residual -1.37640 1.96132 -.00360 .78279 37
 Stud. Deleted Residual -1.866 2.787 .009 1.048 37
 Mahal. Distance .018 8.937 1.946 2.096 37
 Cook's Distance .000 .178 .029 .045 37
 Centered Leverage Value .000 .248 .054 .058 37












1 (Constant) 1.386 .490  2.829 .008
 POWER -.001 .012 -.031 -.101 .920
 TRUST .028 .022 .387 1.277 .210
Note:  a. Dependent Variable: TC
Sig.
